

What is the Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG)?

Overview: As outlined in the FY 17 National Defense Authorization Act, the RSG is a prototype formation designed to explore new capabilities with smaller inventories of new systems before larger, Army-wide, investments are made.¹ Instead of replacing systems inside the Army's existing organization for combat, the RSG involves *full spectrum rapid prototyping* of the operational capability—organizing construct, human capital strategy and equipment—not just the technology. The RSG should be viewed as the vanguard for future Army contributions to Joint Warfighting Operations; structured for flexible mission sets and tight integration with aerospace and maritime power in cross domain warfare.

1. The RSG is a 6,000 Soldier fighting formation with (4) Maneuver (close combat) battalions, (1) Strike (stand-off attack) Battalion, (1) ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) Battalion and (1) Sustainment (logistics) Battalion. The RSG is commanded by a Brigadier General with a Colonel as Chief of staff and Lieutenant Colonels in primary staff positions. As a One Star-commanded force package, the RSG complements the One-Star force packages that reside in the other services (Carrier Battle Group-CVBG/Air Expeditionary Force-AEF/Marine Expeditionary Brigade-MEB).
2. The RSG's Command and Control structure consolidates more combat power under fewer headquarters, provides significantly more combat power per metric ton. The RSG flattens command and control (C2), thus enabling Army Formations to plug into Joint Commands without reliance on intervening, large, vulnerable Division/Corps HQTRS.
3. The RSG is designed from the bottom up around *Maneuver* (mobile armored firepower for close combat and positional advantage), *Strike* (Stand-off Attack Systems), *ISR* (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and *Sustainment* (logistics). Adding maneuver and sustainment to the ISR-strike framework in the aerospace and maritime forces is the key to the integration of capabilities across Service lines in ***joint, integrated "All Arms-All Effects" operations.***
4. Through the use of its organic and Joint ISR and Strike capabilities, the RSG operates with aerospace power to detect, monitor, track and destroy enemies inside a 360 degree battlespace while the RSG's mobile maneuver elements position to wipe out the opposing force with direct fire and stand-off attack systems. As a result, the RSG's ISR-Strike systems not only afford protection to the RSG's maneuver elements, these systems also magnify the striking power of America's Aerospace and Maritime Forces.

¹ Pages 812-214: 23 SEC. 1045. RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE GROUP MATTERS. 24 (a) MODELING OF ALTERNATIVE ARMY DESIGN AND 25 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT.— <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S2943%20-%20Committee-Passed%20NDAA.pdf>

5. The RSG utilizes the best, off-the-shelf, state-of-the-art weapon systems to mitigate risk, save money and speed up delivery of new systems to Army Forces. All RSG weapon systems are mounted on a common chassis, *the German PUMA*, the world's all around best infantry fighting vehicle. This represents a capability that cannot be achieved with other existing platforms. Most important, the PUMA can be built in the USA.

SUMMARY: Without the RSG, the U.S. Army's high-profile, multibillion-dollar acquisition graveyard will continue to grow. Multi-billion dollar failures like WIN-T (\$6 Billion) and integrated battle command system (\$1BCS-2.2 Billion) are poised to join Ground Combat Vehicle, Armed Aerial Scout, and the sprawling 20 Billion Dollar Future Combat System (together more than \$40 billion).² Without the RSG, it will be "business as usual" inside the U.S. Army; an army in which the senior leadership insists the readiness of Army combat forces to deploy and fight is at historically low levels.³ It is against this backdrop of the Army's inability to provide ready, deployable combat power and sustainable modernization programs that the RSG proposal must be viewed.

² Joe Gould, "McHugh: Army Acquisitions' Tale of Failure," *Defense News*, 19 March 2015.

³ Michelle Tan, "Army Readiness at Historically Low Levels," *Army Times*, 12 March 2015, p. 1.